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Abstract 
This paper assesses the change in Federal Reserve policy introduced in 1999, 
with the publication of statements about the outlook for monetary policy (and 
later about the balance of risks) immediately after each FOMC meeting. We 
find that markets anticipated monetary policy decisions equally well under this 
new disclosure regime than before, but arrived at their expectations in different 
ways. Under the new regime, markets extract information from the statements, 
whereas before, they needed to revert to other types of Fed communication in 
the inter-meeting periods, and come to their own assessment of the implications 
of macroeconomic data releases. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
Fed's new disclosure practice may indeed have improved transparency in the 
sense that information is now released to the markets at an earlier time and with 
clearer signals, but that the Fed can extract less information from observing 
market reactions to macroeconomic data releases. 
 
JEL classification: E43, E52, E58, G12 
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In current monetary policy making, an unprecedented degree of transparency has become common 
practice. Such transparency relates to various parts of the policy process, such as the publication of 
the policy objectives and institutional arrangements, of policy models or central bank forecasts of 
relevant variables, or the communication of monetary policy decisions, often including an 
explanation of the underlying considerations that led to the decision or an indication of the likely 
future outlook for monetary policy. A central bank that releases such forward-looking statements is 
the Federal Reserve. Since May 1999, it publishes immediately after meetings of the FOMC a 
statement that not only explains its monetary policy decision, but also contains a forward-looking 
element, in the form of an outlook for the monetary policy stance initially, and a balance-of-risks 
assessment concerning inflationary pressures and economic conditions in the "foreseeable future" 
nowadays. In this paper, we will analyse whether financial markets’ understanding of monetary 
policy has improved and in what way their reaction to central bank communication has changed 
with the change in regime in May 1999. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on three questions: first, have markets been less surprised about 
monetary policy decisions under the new disclosure regime? Second, do market interest rates 
respond to the statements issued by the FOMC under the new regime, and do monetary policy 
decisions affect financial markets differently compared to the old regime? And third, have the 
statements of the new regime helped markets better anticipate the path of future FOMC decisions? 
Concerning the first of these questions, we find no systematic evidence that markets are less 
surprised by FOMC decisions under the new disclosure practice. However, this in itself does not 
necessarily mean that the new disclosure practice is not effective. It only implies that by the time a 
monetary policy decision is made, market participants are nowadays no better prepared to anticipate 
the decisions than they were under the old disclosure regime. In fact, we present evidence that the 
way through which markets arrive at their expectations of monetary policy decisions differs across 
regimes. Through their response to FOMC statements and monetary policy decisions financial 
markets anticipate future monetary policy decisions to a large extent already at the time of the 
release of the FOMC statements. Moreover, the balance-of-risks assessments of the new regime 
generally provide an accurate signal about future FOMC decisions. 
Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the new regime of the Federal Reserve has 
indeed improved the markets' anticipation of future monetary policy decisions, in the sense that the 
new disclosure practice provides market participants with relevant information at an earlier stage. 
Under the regime prior to 1999, markets were, immediately before FOMC meetings, prepared just 
as well as under the new regime, but had to infer this information from other sources. Indeed, we 
find that markets reacted more strongly to other types of Federal Reserve communication in the 
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March 2005inter-meeting periods, such as testimonies, interviews and speeches by FOMC members, as well as 
to releases of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
How shall one assess this regime change? On the one hand, the change in the disclosure regime may 
be interpreted as an increase in transparency as markets are provided with relevant information at an 
earlier stage and in a more transparent manner. This makes it easier and less costly for markets to 
obtain the information, and helps reduce market uncertainty about the future course of monetary 
policy. On the other hand, the reduced importance of macroeconomic news might prove costly for 
the Federal Reserve. The reaction of financial markets to the release of macroeconomic 
fundamentals can be an important source of information for the central bank about the markets’ 
diverse and possibly deviating views. Under its new disclosure policy, the Federal Reserve has less 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade, there has been a remarkable change in the way central banks conduct 
monetary policy. For example, as recently as 1993, the United States’ Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) did not publicly announce its decisions about changes in the federal funds 
target rate after its meetings. In current monetary policy making, an unprecedented degree of 
transparency has become common practice. Such transparency relates to various parts of the policy 
process, such as the publication of the policy objectives and institutional arrangements, of the policy 
models or central bank forecasts of relevant variables, or the communication of monetary policy 
decisions, often including an explanation of the underlying considerations that led to the decision or 
an indication of the likely future outlook for monetary policy.
1 Different central banks have opted 
for different approaches in this respect. In the communication of monetary policy decisions, for 
example, the European Central Bank holds press conferences after each decision on policy rates, 
where the decisions taken are discussed in great detail. Others, like the Bank of England, publish 
minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meetings after two weeks. Others again, like the US 
Federal Reserve, publish a press statement immediately after each meeting that contains not only an 
assessment of the current economic developments and the monetary policy stance but also an 
assessment of the balance of risks in the near future. 
The rationale behind increased transparency is manifold; for the purpose of this paper, we want to 
highlight the role of transparency for improving the efficiency of policy implementation (see, e.g., 
Bernanke 2004). In an environment with a relatively opaque central bank, financial markets need to 
infer the intentions of policy makers. Such inference will necessarily at times be prone to mistakes, 
e.g., if financial markets attribute inappropriate weights to indicators (such as communication by 
policy makers or macroeconomic news), or if there is dissent among market participants about the 
interpretation of relevant news, which will induce uncertainty in financial markets. As emphasised 
by Cecchetti (2000), monetary policy will always be conducted in an uncertain environment – “but 
in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policy makers can reduce: the uncertainty they 
themselves create” (p. 32).  
In this paper, we analyse whether central bank transparency can indeed improve the efficiency of 
monetary policy making. Our testing vehicle is the change in regime that has occurred in 1999 at 
the US Federal Reserve, when the FOMC decided to publish immediately after its meetings a 
statement that not only explains its monetary policy decision, but also contains a forward-looking 
element, in the form of an outlook for the monetary policy stance initially, and a balance-of-risks 
assessment concerning inflationary pressures and economic conditions in the "foreseeable future" 
                                                           
1 For two influential works on the importance of transparency see Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Blinder 
(1998). An overview of the various forms of central bank transparency, the theoretical justifications for 
transparency and the recent empirical evidence of its effects is provided in Geraats (2002). On a cautious note 
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that transparency might go too far and should only be supported if it helps achieving the central bank’s tasks                                                              
see Mishkin (2004).  
nowadays. As argued in Bernanke et al. (2004) and Gurkaynak et al. (2004), financial markets 
attribute considerable importance to statements about the future path of policy. We will use the 
change in regime to analyse whether financial markets’ understanding of monetary policy has 
improved and in what way their reaction to central bank communication has changed. 
The focus of our analysis will be the reaction of market interest rates to monetary policy, since they 
are closely linked with the policy rate. We focus on three questions: first, have markets been less 
surprised about monetary policy decisions under the new disclosure regime? Second, do market 
interest rates respond to the statements issued by the FOMC under the new regime, and do monetary 
policy decisions affect financial markets differently compared to the old regime? And third, have 
the statements of the new regime helped markets better anticipate the path of future FOMC 
decisions? Concerning the first of these questions, we find no systematic evidence that markets are 
less surprised by FOMC decisions under the new disclosure practice. However, this in itself does 
not necessarily mean that the new disclosure practice is not effective. It only implies that by the time 
a monetary policy decision is made, market participants are nowadays no better prepared to 
anticipate the decisions than they were under the old disclosure regime. In fact, we present evidence 
that the way through which markets arrive at their expectations of monetary policy decisions differs 
across regimes. Through their response to FOMC statements and monetary policy decisions interest 
rates anticipate future monetary policy decisions to a large extent already at the time of the release 
of the FOMC statements. Moreover, the balance-of-risks assessments of the new regime generally 
provide an accurate signal about future FOMC decisions. 
Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the new regime of the Federal Reserve has 
indeed improved the markets' anticipation of future monetary policy decisions, in the sense that the 
new disclosure practice provides market participants with relevant information at an earlier stage. 
Under the regime prior to 1999, markets were, immediately before FOMC meetings, prepared just 
as well as under the new regime, but had to infer this information from other sources. Indeed, we 
find that markets reacted more strongly to other types of Federal Reserve communication in the 
inter-meeting periods, such as testimonies, interviews and speeches by FOMC members, as well as 
to releases of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The question is how to assess this regime change. On the one hand, it may be interpreted as an 
increase in transparency as markets are provided with relevant information at an earlier stage and in 
a more transparent manner. This makes it easier and less costly for markets to obtain the 
information, and helps reduce market uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy. On 
the other hand, our finding that markets attach more importance to the statements and the balance-
of-risks assessments at FOMC meetings and less importance to news about macroeconomic 
fundamentals is contrary in spirit to King (2000), who argues that, with a transparent monetary 
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policy reaction function, news should not be in the announcements of central banks, but should 
entirely arise in the development of the economy. We furthermore believe that the reaction of 
financial markets to the release of macroeconomic fundamentals can be an important source of 
information for the central bank about the markets’ diverse and possibly deviating views. Under its 
new disclosure policy, the Federal Reserve has less such information available.  
In the remainder of this paper, we describe the changes in the FOMC disclosure practices that have 
occurred since 1994 in section 2, and ask whether the balance-of-risks statements have provided an 
accurate signal about future monetary policy decisions. Section 3 introduces the data underlying our 
analysis. Section 4 analyses the effect of the new disclosure regime, looking at the accuracy of 
market expectations of monetary policy decisions, the reaction of markets to monetary policy, and 
the role of alternative sources of information, namely other central bank communication and 
releases of macroeconomic fundamentals. Section 5 summarises the results and concludes. 
 
2.  The balance-of-risks assessments of the FOMC  
2.1   Changes in the FOMC disclosure practices 
 
1994: Immediate release of decisions on the federal funds target rate 
A major change in the disclosure practice of the Federal Reserve took place in February 1994, when 
the FOMC started announcing decisions on the intended federal funds rate on the day of its 
meetings. Before, markets needed to infer the intended rate from the type and size of the open 
market operations by the Federal Reserve, until the decision was published after the subsequent 
FOMC meeting. There is substantial evidence that this change has improved the markets’ 
understanding of monetary policy considerably: Lange et al. (2003), Poole and Rasche (2003) and 
Demiralp (2001) observe that markets were able to improve their forecasts of monetary policy 
decisions, and they relate this to the change in transparency.
2 Lee (2002) shows that the effect of 
Fed announcements on interest rate volatility has decreased in the last decades. However, his 
analysis ends in 1999; we will demonstrate below that there have been further changes in the 
volatility following monetary policy actions since 1999. Demiralp and Jorda (2002) provide 
evidence that by announcing changes in the intended Federal funds rate, it was possible to move the 
Federal funds rate with a smaller volume of open-market operations than prior to 1994, which 
indicates clearly that increased transparency can indeed be beneficial for the efficiency of policy 
implementation. Given the importance of this structural change, we will use only the post-1994 
period in our analysis. 
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1999: Immediate release of an assessment about the likely future path of monetary policy 
Between 1983 and 1998, the FOMC issued a policy directive comprising the committee's 
expectations about the relative chances of an increase or decrease in the federal funds target rate as 
well as instructions for current policy to the Open Market Trading Desk. These directives focused in 
particular on the inter-meeting period and were not made public until after subsequent FOMC 
meetings. In December 1998, the FOMC decided that it would release its assessment about the 
likely future path of monetary policy without delay after its meetings, “to communicate to the 
public a major shift in its views about the balance of risks or the likely direction of future policy” 
(Federal Reserve Board, 1998). In the course of 1999, the FOMC made six such announcements. As 
an example for the phrasing of these statements, the first such statement, which was released on 
May 18, 1999, noted that “[…] the Committee was concerned about the potential for a build-up of 
inflationary imbalances that could undermine the favourable performance of the economy and 
therefore adopted a directive that is tilted toward the possibility of a firming in the stance of 
monetary policy.” (Federal Reserve Board, 1999). As there had been a debate among FOMC 
members about the likely effects of such releases  - some arguing that the statements would allow 
financial markets to price the future course of monetary policy more accurately, others that fear of 
market reactions would make the FOMC more cautious in changing the outlook - it was decided to 
evaluate after some time whether further changes would be desirable.  
 
2000: Modifications to the release: the balance-of-risks assessments 
One year later, at its meeting in December 1999, the FOMC decided to follow the proposals made 
by a Working Group on the Directive and Disclosure Policy and to modify its disclosure 
proceedings in four ways: i) a statement would now be issued after every FOMC meeting, not only 
in the case of policy action or a major shift in the views about future developments; ii) the statement 
would cover a time horizon that extends beyond the next FOMC meeting; iii) the statement would 
no longer be phrased in terms of a bias with respect to future interest rate changes, but instead in 
terms of the balance of risks to the goals of price stability and economic growth; iv) the balance of 
risks statement would be assembled from a set of pre-defined sentences. 
The FOMC strictly adhered to the new rules until March 2003, when it decided not to convey a 
balance of risks in the light of the large uncertainties due to the US intervention in Iraq. In the 
subsequent meetings, an assessment of the balance of risks was provided again, although it was no 
longer taken from the set of pre-defined sentences. The main reason for this modification has to be 
seen in the possibility to provide separate assessments of the risks to both goals, which was not 
foreseen in the predefined sentences (Federal Reserve Board, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 Bomfim and Reinhart (2000), however, observe that the reactions of financial markets to monetary policy 
surprises did not change pre and post 1994. 
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In this paper, we will in general analyse the period from May 1999 to April 2004 and compare it 
with the period from February 1994 to April 1999. Although there could potentially be differences 
in the way markets react to the statements made in 1999 and those released since, we will only 
analyse the case of the 1999 statements separately when this is feasible despite the few observations 
that are available. In the remainder of the paper, we will use the phrases “bias”, “balance-of-risks 
assessments” or “the statements” interchangeably, generally referring to both types of statements. 
 
2.2  Consistency of balance-of-risks assessments 
In this section, we analyse whether the FOMC’s balance-of-risks assessments are generally 
consistent with future monetary policy decisions, a necessary condition if the statements are meant 
to help markets anticipate better future decisions. In doing so, we assume that markets interpreted 
an assessment highlighting the risks of inflation as pointing to higher interest rates, and an 
assessment that stresses the risks to economic growth as pointing to lower interest rates.
3 
Table 1 shows how often the bias was followed or not followed by an according monetary policy 
decision at the subsequent meeting for the two sub-periods February 1994-April 1999 and May 
1999- April 2004. One important caveat is that the policy directives prior to May 1999, as discussed 
in section 2, focused on the inter-meeting period only and did not provide any clue to markets about 
the next monetary policy decision since they were released publicly only after the subsequent 
meeting. It is nevertheless interesting to compare the consistency of policy biases across these two 
periods.
4 
Table 1 reveals that 28 out of 42 bias announcements (67%) in 1999-2004 were followed by 
corresponding monetary policy decisions.
5 A closer look at the remaining 14 announcements 
reveals that there has not been a single case in this period when the Federal Reserve changed 
interest rates with an asymmetric bias pointing in the wrong direction (which would certainly be the 
worst case of inconsistency). In two cases, interest rates were tightened while the bias released at 
                                                           
3 Poole (2004) rightly argues that employment and inflation are not highly correlated, such that “an 
unbalanced balance-or-risks statement should not be interpreted as an indication of a future policy action in a 
specific direction.” However, he also admits that “unfortunately, it is too often interpreted that way by market 
participants.” 
4 A second caveat is that since 2000 the focus of the statements has been not on the inter-meeting period any 
longer, but over the foreseeable future. Hence a balance-of-risks assessment may still be consistent with 
future monetary policy decisions if there is an asymmetric assessment and a corresponding policy change 
occurs two or more meetings later, and the same assessment was issued at the next meetings as well. Since 
1999, there was only one such case, 13 August 2002, which is classified as a "correct" anticipation of future 
decisions in the tables. 
5 Throughout the paper, we have excluded the FOMC meeting on September 17
th, 2001, when interest rates 
were decreased by 50 bp in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11
th. We have done this due to the 
exceptional circumstances of this FOMC meeting. Excluding also other unscheduled meetings does not affect 
our results. An interesting case in this regard is represented by the unscheduled meeting on January 3
rd, 2001, 
where the FOMC decided to lower its target rate by 50 basis points. This interest rate cut was preceded by a 
change in the direction of the balance-of-risks assessment, which had been tilted towards inflationary risks in 
November 2000, and was turned into one highlighting risks of economic weakness in December 2000. 
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the preceding meeting was symmetric (probably a less serious case of inconsistency, but 
nonetheless important as the bias has not helped anticipating the change). The other 12 cases consist 
of situations where an asymmetric bias was not followed by corresponding action (which is not 
necessarily inconsistent, as the bias is by no means meant to indicate that action will automatically 
follow). Overall, these statistics indicate that FOMC biases were consistent with policy actions in 
the 1999-2004 period.  
 
 
However, these findings do not necessarily imply that the biases improve the ability of markets to 
anticipate future decisions. For instance, an asymmetric bias may provide little additional 
information if the FOMC issued a lot of asymmetric biases but monetary policy hardly ever 
changed. To test this case, rows (3) and (4) in Table 2 show that, although the FOMC indeed issued 
a lot of asymmetric balance-of-risks assessments since 1999 (namely at 69.1% of all FOMC 
meetings), the probability that a change in interest rates is preceded by such an asymmetric 
assessment (which furthermore has the correct sign) is statistically significantly larger at 89.5%.  
Market expectations of monetary policy decisions could obviously improve if an asymmetric bias 
were to increase the probability of a corresponding interest rate change at the next meeting. Rows 
(1) and (2) in Table 2 reveal that, in 1999-2004, 58.6% of all asymmetric biases were followed by 
corresponding interest rate changes at the next meeting. By contrast, interest rates were changed 
only at 45.2% of all meetings. The conditional probability of an asymmetric bias being followed by 
a corresponding policy move is therefore higher than the unconditional probability of a policy 
change, although we do not find this difference to be statistically significant. 
Overall, we conclude that the new disclosure regime since 1999 has improved transparency of 
Federal Reserve policy in that it has provided useful information for anticipating future monetary 
policy decisions. 
A comparison of the old and the new disclosure regime provides some revealing differences and a 
better understanding of the underlying motivations of the different disclosure practices. Table 1 for 
1994-99 shows that the FOMC provided fewer asymmetric policy directives and also made fewer 
interest rate changes than in 1999-2004. However, Table 2 reveals that the directives provided a 
poor prediction of monetary policy actions at the subsequent FOMC meetings. In only 28.6% of the 
cases was an asymmetric bias followed by a corresponding policy change, which is lower than the 
31.8% of meetings when the FOMC actually changed interest rates (see rows (1) and (2) of Table 
2). Similarly, only 42.9% of interest rate changes were preceded by an asymmetric bias, whereas the 
FOMC had a policy tilt in 47.7% of the meetings (see rows (3) and (4)). Rows (5) and (6) indicate 
12
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that in more than half of the cases were the policy directives not followed in the next FOMC 
meeting. 
This raises the question of why there is such a sharp difference in the biases across the two regimes. 
One central factor is that the policy directives until May 1999 were clearly directed at internal Fed 
objectives and were not intended to provide public information since they focused on the inter-
meeting period and were released only after the next FOMC meeting. By contrast, the balance-of-
risks assessments since 1999 mainly have an external objective in that they intend to provide the 
markets with additional information about possible future policy decisions and surrounding risks. 
For this information to be credible, the biases need to be broadly in line with actual policy 
decisions. 
This nevertheless leaves open the question why the policy directives before 1999 were so much out 
of sync with monetary policy decisions. One possible explanation is that because the assessments 
were targeted at an external audience after May 1999, their consistency was ensured – or, 
alternatively, that only once their consistency became feasible, the FOMC decided to target them to 
an external audience. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the purpose of the earlier directives is not 
clear. Thornton and Wheelock (2000) argue that the main internal Fed objective of the directive 
before 1999 was that of consensus building. In other words, the policy directive may have been 
used to increase the number of FOMC members supporting the current decision. For instance, 
FOMC members may be more willing to agree to a change in policy if at the same time a neutral 
directive is adopted, indicating the FOMC’s intention not to embark on further changes. 
Rows (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) in the lower panel of Table 2 confirm that for 65.9% of the FOMC 
meetings in 1994-99, the issued policy directive was contrary to the monetary policy decision at the 
same meeting, i.e. unchanged interest rates were accompanied by an asymmetric bias or changed 
interest rates by a neutral bias, whereas only in 34.1% of the meetings was the directive the same as 
the policy action. By contrast, for 59.5% of the FOMC meetings since 1999, the biases have been 
consistent with the policy decisions. 
 
3.  The data 
3.1 Interest rates 
Our interest rate data consists of constant maturity treasury rates which are provided by the US 
Treasury. We expect the effect of monetary policy actions to differ depending on the maturity of the 
interest rate. For instance, a tightening of monetary policy can be compatible with a reduction in 
long-term interest rates if markets perceive the tightening as a credible step by monetary authorities 
to reduce inflation in the long run. The effect of a monetary policy decision on long rates can 
therefore be not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively different from that on shorter maturities. 
Furthermore, in order to understand the effects of central bank communication on market 
13
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expectations about the future course of monetary policy, it will be revealing to see which maturity 
spectrum reacts strongest. Accordingly, we look at maturities of 3 and 6 months as well as 1, 2, 5, 
10 and 20 years. 
As to the frequency of the analysis, we use daily frequency rather than intra-day or tick-by-tick 
data. The drawback of choosing a lower frequency is that other events and news during the day may 
introduce some noise, thereby possibly making the measurement of announcement effects less 
accurate. However, over a sufficiently long time sample, the effect of other news should average out 
to zero, such that the coefficient estimates are estimated with larger standard errors, but are 
nonetheless unbiased. The advantage of using daily data is to avoid estimating biased coefficients 
that can arise if overshooting occurs in the very short run.  
As we have shown in previous work (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004a), the daily interest rate data 
are characterised by negative skewness, excess kurtosis, non-normality and serial correlation. The 
econometric model therefore needs to take into account these specific data characteristics. 
 
3.2 Expectations of monetary policy decisions and macroeconomic announcements 
Our expectations data for monetary policy decisions and macroeconomic announcements originate 
from surveys conducted by Reuters and Money Markets Services International among market 
participants, conducted on Fridays before each FOMC meeting and the release of the various 
macroeconomic data. We use the mean of the survey as our benchmark expectations measure, 
although using the median yields similar results.
6 We have shown in earlier work (Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2004a and 2004b) that the survey data are unbiased and efficient. 
As an alternative to survey data on monetary policy decisions, expectations can be extracted from 
the Fed funds futures rate, as proposed by Kuttner (2001). We have tested our results for robustness 
with respect to the choice of the measure for market expectations. However, our preferred measure 
is the ones based on surveys, which allows us to extract not only the market expectation (through 
the mean or median response), but also a measure of uncertainty (through the disagreement across 
survey respondents), which we will analyse in section 4.2. This choice is also supported by 
Söderström (2001), who provides evidence that it is difficult for futures-based expectation measures 
to outperform the survey-based measures. Finally, Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) show that Fed 
funds futures rates can only be used as measures for market expectations about future monetary 
policy once risk premia are properly taken into account. 
We construct the surprise component contained in each announcement by deducting the expectation 
from the actual announcement.
7 For days without announcements, this surprise is defined to be zero. 
We will make use of this surprise variable to measure the effect of announcements on markets. The 
                                                           
6 This has consistently been found also in earlier work with this data (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2004b). 
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reason why we do not use the actual announcements is that their expected component is already 
priced into the market prior to the announcement. At the point of the announcement, the market 
reacts merely to the surprise component contained in the news (see, e.g., Kuttner, 2001). Analysing 
the reaction of markets to surprises is therefore a proxy to assess the importance of the underlying 
announcement. 
 
3.3 FOMC communication 
We analyse two types of central bank communication. First, we look at the effect of the FOMC 
statements about the outlook for monetary policy and the balance of risk assessment described in 
section 2 themselves. We classify these statements according to their implications for the future 
interest rate path, and construct two indicator variables. The indicator “symmetric bias” takes the 
value one on those days where the FOMC released a statement that it perceives the risks of 
economic weakness and of inflationary pressure as balanced, and zero on all other days. The 
indicator “asymmetric bias” takes the value one for statements that highlight a risk of inflationary 
pressure, the value minus one for statements that consider the risk to be tilted towards economic 
weakness, and the value zero otherwise.
8 
Second, we look at other communication made by FOMC members in the inter-meeting periods. 
This data set includes three types of communication - speeches, interviews and testimonies - and 
includes all FOMC members. The data is extracted from a widely used newswire service, Reuters 
News, which provides a news report usually within minutes of each statement.
9 This way of 
collecting the data is somewhat different from that used by Kohn and Sack (2003), who take all 
speeches and testimonies made by FOMC members. The key difference is that Reuters News reports 
the great majority but not all of these statements since it may decide to leave out a statement if it 
considers it as not providing new or market relevant information. Since our primary focus is on the 
market reaction and perception in response to communication by the Federal Reserve, the Reuters 
News source may be more appropriate for this purpose. 
We use the extracted data in two ways in our empirical model. First, we include each statement as a 
dummy with the value one for those days when the statement took place and zero otherwise. 
Second, we classify each statement by whether it provides information about the economic outlook 
(C
EC) or future monetary policy (C






















   


















                                                           
8 Obviously, also here Bill Poole’s caveats mentioned in footnote 3 apply. 
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Clearly, we should stress that an important caveat is that this classification is judgmental and 
reflects our own reading of the statements as reported by Reuters News. It is therefore possible that 
we may have misclassified some statements in that markets have interpreted them differently. It is 
also possible that markets interpret the statements differently from what was intended by the FOMC 
member. A more detailed account of the methodology and discussion of the caveats is provided in 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004c). 
 
4.  The effect of the new disclosure regime 
4.1 Hypotheses on the effect of the new regime: An illustrative example 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the differences in the adjustment of the 3-month t-bill rate 
around two consecutive FOMC meeting dates under the two disclosure regimes. In both cases, no 
change occurred at the first of the two FOMC meetings (marked as day 0 on the horizontal axis) and 
a rise in the federal funds target rate by 25 bp took place in the subsequent meetings (marked as day 
30). One of these meetings - 25 March 1997 - occurred under the old regime when the FOMC had 
actually adopted a tightening bias in the preceding meeting, which was not made public. The second 
of these meetings - 2 February 2000 - took place under the new regime when the FOMC had 
adopted and released an asymmetric bias towards tightening at the preceding FOMC meeting.  
In both instances, the policy decision to change interest rates was well predicted by the market, as 
can be seen by the fact that interest rates had already increased substantially by the time the FOMC 
met. However, it is apparent that this anticipation of the decision was achieved through very 
different mechanisms in the two regimes. 
 
 
The figure illustrates that, in the new disclosure regime, markets already priced in most of the 25-bp 
rise of the next meeting within one day of the bias announcement. After this initial jump, market 
interest rates remained relatively stable and rose gradually until the next meeting. By contrast, under 
the old regime interest rates hardly moved at the first meeting, but then adjusted much more 
strongly towards the second meeting when the 25 bp change was implemented.  
This illustration raises various questions about the effect of the change in regime, which we will 
attempt to answer empirically in the subsequent sections: 
1)  Has the release of the balance-of-risks assessments improved the ability of markets to anticipate 
a monetary policy decision by the time when the FOMC meets? 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 The same source and methodology has been used in Fratzscher (2004) for the analysis of the effectiveness of 
exchange rate communication in the G3 economies. 
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2)  Have markets changed their behaviour on the days of the FOMC meetings? Do they react to the 
release of the statements, and if so, how? 
3)  Do interest rate reactions in response to the release of the statements anticipate the required 
adjustment between FOMC meetings, such that lower inter-meeting interest rate adjustments 
are needed under the new regime? And, finally, 
4)  Is the release of the statements a substitute or a complement to other sources of information, 
like inter-meeting communication by FOMC members or macroeconomic data releases that 
might have allowed markets in the earlier regime to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
equally well? 
 
4.2 Market expectations of monetary policy actions 
Since the FOMC statements are released in order to communicate to the markets the FOMC’s 
assessment of future developments, a first natural question is whether they have improved the 
predictability of monetary policy decisions. However, it has been shown that monetary policy 
decisions had been anticipated by market participants very well since 1994 (Lange et al., 2003; 
Poole and Rasche, 2003; Demiralp, 2001), such that it might be difficult to improve upon this 
performance. 
Table 3 reports various statistics regarding the expectations data, separately for all scheduled 
FOMC meeting dates as well as for those where interest rates were actually changed. We analyse 
these dates separately because on several occasions, the decision that interest rates would remain 
unchanged was extremely easy to predict. As such, we think that the prediction of actual interest 
rate changes is a more stringent test of the forecastability of FOMC decisions. First, we find that the 
mean surprise over all sub-samples (shown in the second rows of the panels in Table 3) is 
insignificantly different from zero (as indicated by the t-statistics provided in the third rows of the 
panels in Table 3), regardless of whether interest rates are changed or not. The columns denoted by 
∆ report the results of tests for differences across the sub-samples: we cannot find any difference in 
the size of the mean surprise. 
However, even if the surprises are zero on average, they could be drawn from different 
distributions, e.g. if for one period there are more large (positive and negative) surprises. We test for 
this in four different ways: i) by checking whether the variance of the surprise over time is different 
across time periods, ii) by calculating the mean absolute surprise, iii) through the variance of the 
absolute surprise, and iv) with the maximum absolute surprise. In only one case do we find a 
statistically significant difference, and only at the 90% level: the variance of the absolute surprise 
has been significantly smaller in 1999 than in the period 1994-1999 for FOMC meetings on which 
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Since the survey-based measures of expectations are constructed from the answers of several 
respondents, it is possible to analyse the extent to which the respondents disagree.
10 This will also 
be informative about the predictability of monetary policy decisions: the more respondents agree, 
the easier the decisions can apparently be predicted. The natural way to look at this issue would be 
to calculate the standard deviation across responses in each survey. Since for some surveys we only 
have information on the share of respondents that gave a certain answer, but do not know the 
overall number of participants, we cannot calculate the standard deviation. Instead, we have 
calculated a different measure of dispersion, the mean deviation.
11 We do this for every survey, and 
then take the mean of this statistic over all meetings for each sub-sample, yielding the “mean mean 
deviation”. As an alternative, although rather crude measure, we define a dummy variable that is 
equal to one for each survey where respondents recorded dissenting answers, and zero if all 
respondents answer in the same way. Again, we construct the mean of this variable (which we call 
“dissent”) across the surveys for each sub-sample and compare across periods. For none of these 
measures, we can detect any statistically significant differences. 
This leads us to the conclusions that market anticipations of monetary policy decisions have been 
relatively accurate throughout the period since 1994, and that there has basically been no 
improvement since 1999. 
 
4.3 Market reactions to monetary policy 
The finding that financial markets are as surprised by monetary policy decisions under the new as 
under the old disclosure regime does not necessarily imply that there is no difference in the process 
through which markets arrive at their expectations. For example, it could be that markets do indeed 
learn important information about future monetary policy decisions from the balance-of-risks 
assessments of the new regime, whereas under the old regime markets acquired this information 
through alternative channels. The focus of this section is therefore to analyse, first, whether 
financial markets behave differently on FOMC meeting days under the two regimes. Second, we 
investigate whether the balance-of-risks statements themselves affect interest rates, and whether the 
reaction of markets to monetary policy surprises depends on the content of the accompanying 
balance-of-risks statements. 
 
                                                           
10 In a similar test, Swanson (2004) finds that there is less diversity in the interest rate forecasts of private 
sector forecasters since the late 1980s. 
11 The mean deviation is defined as  ∑ = − ≡
N
i i N x x MD
1
1 | | , where x is the mean of the distribution and N 
denotes the sample size. To calculate MD, it is sufficient to know the mean of the distribution and the shares 
of the respondents with answer xi. 
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Market behaviour on FOMC meeting days 
Do markets behave differently on FOMC meeting days under the new disclosure regime, where a 
statement accompanies each meeting? To test this hypothesis, we employ an EGARCH(1,1) model 
following Nelson (1991) in which the conditional mean equations for the changes in the market 
interest rates ∆rt are expressed as a function of the surprise component of a monetary policy 
decision, st. The effects of the surprises are modelled separately for each regime by interacting them 
with a dummy, Dt, which is equal to one for the new regime, and zero otherwise. Additionally, we 
enter the regime dummy separately and control for the surprise components of the releases of 
important macroeconomic data and for communication by the members of the FOMC (zi.t; the 
results for each of the controls will be discussed further below), past interest rate changes, as well as 
day-of-the-week effects (Mon, Fri):
 12 
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We assume that  t t t v h ⋅ = ε , where  t v is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and unit variance. The 
conditional variance  t h  is formulated as a function of the past variance ( 1 − t h ) and innovations 
( 1 − t ε ), as well as the day-of-the-week effects (Mon, Fri). The effect of FOMC meeting days is 
modelled by a dummy variable (nt), as well as the effect of macro announcements and FOMC 
communication (wi,t). The EGARCH approach accounts for the skewness, kurtosis and the time-
varying volatility of the interest rate data by formulating a non-normal density for the residuals of 
the interest rate processes in the following way: 
 
() ()


















+ + + − + +

































) 1 ( ln
2
ln
       (2) 
 
A further advantage of the EGARCH approach is that it does not require us to impose non-
negativity constraints on the coefficients of the conditional second moments. The model is 
estimated via log-likelihood estimation of the function 
 
                                                           
12 Day-of-the-week effects were also tested for other days, but only the coefficients for the Friday and 
Monday dummies were found to be significant in some specifications. 
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with T the number of observations, and µ the vector of parameters of interest. 
If an announced decision on the intended Federal funds rate and the future course of monetary 
policy is understood by market participants, a monetary policy decision should not lead to market 
uncertainty. Accordingly, we would expect to see a smaller effect of FOMC meetings on market 
volatility if the central bank is more transparent about the future course of monetary policy under 
the new regime, i.e.  1 κ  >  2 κ . The implications for the mean equation are less straightforward. A 
more opaque monetary policy communication is likely to imply that markets will need longer to 
come to a final assessment of the implications of any given policy decision – which is precisely why 
we would expect to see market volatility rising. For the level of interest rates, this implies that the 
reactions are more protracted, whereas a transparent monetary policy will trigger the full adjustment 
of interest rates instantaneously. Whether we would expect a larger or smaller response depends on 
the adjustment path in the opaque regime, though. On the one hand, if there is an overshooting on 
the day of the announcement that is corrected later on, the effect is larger in the opaque regime than 
in the transparent one. On the other hand, if rates react gradually until they reach their new 
equilibrium level, the market reaction on the announcement day is smaller in the relatively more 
opaque regime.
13  
Table 4a shows the coefficients  1 γ  and  2 γ  of the mean equation (1) for the various interest rate 
maturities, separated for the different disclosure regimes. As the two coefficients are estimated 
jointly in one model, we can test for differences in the coefficients across the two samples. The 
corresponding results are reported in the last column of Table 4a. We find that generally, there is no 
significant difference across regimes. 
 
 
The test for the effect of FOMC meetings on market volatility is more revealing. Table 4b reports 
the coefficients in the volatility equation for the two regimes. Volatility in response to FOMC 
decisions is generally lower under the new disclosure regime. In particular, FOMC decisions that 
are accompanied by statements under the new regime do no longer increase volatility for maturities 
up to and including one year. 
                                                           
13 This reasoning is in two respects different from the one proposed by Demiralp (2001), who argues that the 
effect on the day of the announcement should be smaller if more of the announcement has been anticipated. 
First, we only look at the surprise component, not the announcement itself, and second, we have shown in the 
previous section that the anticipation effect has not changed across the disclosure regimes, in that the 
expectations of decisions just before FOMC meetings have not improved. 
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In sum, the results suggest that the change in the Federal Reserve's disclosure practice has indeed 
had a significant effect on financial markets, mainly by reducing the volatility of interest rates at 
short maturities on the day of the FOMC meetings.  
 
Market reactions to the FOMC balance-of-risks statements 
So far we have analysed whether FOMC meetings per se have a different effect on markets in the 
two regimes. In this subsection, we go one step further and analyse whether the balance-of-risks 
assessments of the new regime affect markets differently depending on whether they are tilted 
towards easing or tightening as compared to being neutral, and whether markets react differently to 
the monetary policy surprise, depending on whether the balance of risk is symmetric or asymmetric. 
To test these hypotheses, we modify the model of (1)-(2) further and estimate: 
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over the new disclosure regime only. All variables and parameters are defined as for model (1)-(2), 
except that we now introduce a dummy variable St which takes the value one if the FOMC meeting 
is accompanied by a neutral balance-of-risks statement, and a dummy variable At which is set to one 
if the risk assessment points towards a tightening of monetary policy, to minus one in case of a tilt 
towards easing of monetary policy, and zero otherwise. The hypotheses that this model allows us to 
test are whether, first, the release of an asymmetric bias has an effect on market interest rates 
compared to the release of a symmetric bias ( 2 α  and  3 α ), whether such a release induces market 
volatility ( 2 ω  and  3 ω ) and whether markets react differently to the surprise component contained 
in a monetary policy decision, depending on whether the accompanying risk assessment is 
symmetric or asymmetric ( 1 γ  and  2 γ ). 
 
 
As shown in the first two columns of Table 5a, the release of an asymmetric bias in itself led to a 
change in market rates: a tightening (easing) bias increases (decreases) interest rates by around one 
to two basis points, predominantly at the shorter maturities. However, there does not seem to be an 
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important difference in the effect of the statements themselves on market volatility. Generally, the 
differences between the effect of a symmetric and an asymmetric bias are not statistically 
significant (Table 5b). 
Interestingly, the strength of the response of short-term interest rates to monetary policy surprises 
depends on the type of statement: in the case of an asymmetric bias, the response is significantly 
larger than the responses to surprises that are accompanied by symmetric statements. This implies 
that the release of an asymmetric bias can not only change the assessment of the future path of 
monetary policy, it can also be useful information for markets in interpreting the present decision. 
Looking at the individual cases, we find that this result is mainly driven by events where the FOMC 
decided to change interest rates by 50 basis points (and thus by more than was expected by the 
markets), while signalling at the same time that the bias continues to be in the same direction, i.e. 
that there could be further changes ahead.
14 
We conclude that the release of balance-of-risks statements after each meeting under the new 
regime has had a significant effect on financial markets. Asymmetric balance-of-risks statements 
are particularly important since they affect the level of interest rates and can at times increase their 
response to monetary policy surprises. 
 
4.4 Interest-rate adjustment in the inter-meeting periods 
The evidence presented so far shows that the balance-of-risks statements are used by financial 
markets to predict the future course of monetary policy, which leads to reduced market uncertainty, 
a reaction of interest rates to asymmetric statements and a differential response to announced 
monetary policy decisions when these are accompanied by asymmetric statements. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that market participants can indeed also better anticipate future monetary 
policy decisions already at the time when the statements are released, i.e. immediately after the 
FOMC meetings. The aim of this section is therefore to analyse whether markets have improved 
their ability to anticipate future decisions already at such an early stage. A necessary condition for 
this is the consistency of the policy bias with future monetary policy decisions, for which we have 
found supportive evidence in section 2. However, the fact that we know this today with hindsight 
does not necessarily imply that markets believed this at the time when the biases were released. 
Markets may have had to learn how to respond and act under the new policy regime and this may 
mean that markets may possibly have attached limited weight to these balance-of-risks assessments. 
Although markets reacted more strongly to monetary policy news on FOMC days with biases, as 
shown above, this does not necessarily mean that markets have actually been better in anticipating 
                                                           
14 For example, on November 6, 2001, interest rates were decreased by 50 basis points, whereas markets had 
only priced in 40 basis points. Three-month rates dropped by 16 basis points on that day, thus exceeding the 
magnitude of the surprise. One year later, on November 6, 2002, interest rates were again decreased by 50 
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basis points, while the market expectations had been at 25 basis points only. Three-month rates fell by 19                                                                                                                                                        
                            basis points on this day, leading to a near one-to-one movement along with the surprise.  
future monetary policy decisions under the new disclosure regime already at the time when the bias 
assessment was made. 
To analyse this issue, we test whether market interest rates changed as much during the inter-
meeting period under the new regime as under the old disclosure regime. The hypothesis is that if 
the statements and biases issued under the new regime have helped markets anticipate future 
monetary policy decisions better, then one should see a smaller change in market interest rates 
between the point in time when the bias announcement has been priced into the market and the next 
FOMC meeting. 
Table 6 reports statistics for the mean absolute changes, the variance of the absolute changes and 
the maximum absolute change in the 3-month interest rates between the day following an FOMC 
meeting and the day preceding the next FOMC meeting. The upper panel presents the results for all 
FOMC meeting days, the lower one only for those days when monetary policy rates were changed 
in the subsequent meeting. 
 
 
The results reveal that the inter-meeting adjustment in market interest rates was statistically 
significantly lower in 2000-04, in particular when monetary policy changed in the subsequent 
meeting. When policy changes occurred, the average absolute inter-meeting change in market 
interest rates in the inter-meeting period was 36.2 bp in 1994-99, whereas it fell to 17.8 bp in 2000-
2004. This finding is even more remarkable considering that the policy changes in 2000-2004 were 
much larger (10 of the 16 changes in 2000-2004 were 50 bp changes) than those in 1994-99 - when 
only 3 of the 14 changes were 50 bp and one 75 bp. Finally, also the variance of the absolute 
changes in market rates across the FOMC meetings has been significantly smaller under the new 
than under the old disclosure regime, both for all FOMC meetings and those with interest rate 
changes. 
 
4.5 Alternative sources of information: communication and macro news 
We have so far presented three pieces of evidence: first, we have found that markets have been as 
much surprised by monetary policy decisions, when comparing the expectations just before each 
meeting with the actual decisions, under the new disclosure regime as under the old one (Section 
4.2). Second, markets react more strongly to monetary policy surprises under the new regime if an 
asymmetric bias has been adopted by the FOMC (Section 4.3), and third, they also are better in 
anticipating the next monetary policy decision under the new disclosure regime (Section 4.4). The 
first of these findings may seem to contradict the second and third of the results. The question 
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therefore is: what explains that the FOMC balance-of-risks statements under the new regime 
provide information that helps markets in anticipating future decisions, but even without the 
statements markets managed to predict the upcoming decision equally well just prior to the next 
FOMC meeting? 
It must be the case that under the old regime markets were capable of extracting information from 
other sources in the inter-meeting period. In this section, we ask what this information may have 
been. We look in particular at two types of information: other Federal Reserve communication, such 
as speeches, interviews and testimonies by FOMC members, and macroeconomic news about the 
economic outlook and inflationary pressures. 
 
The role of central bank communication 
In between their meetings, FOMC members have the possibility to convey new information to the 
markets by making public speeches. Kohn and Sack (2003) argue that such statements convey 
important information to market participants and as such can affect market interest rates. As 
mentioned above, we would expect that markets have understood the future course of monetary 
policy better since 1999, such that their need to extract information from inter-meeting 
communication by FOMC members might be reduced. In our estimates of model (1)-(2) in the 
preceding section, we already entered the communication of FOMC members as a control variable. 
The results for the corresponding variables will be of interest here. In the benchmark model we 
distinguished communication by content (with respect to the economic outlook and monetary 
policy, as described in section 3.3). In this section, we will furthermore distinguish it by occasion 
(namely, hearings, interviews and speeches).
15  
Table 7a shows the effects on the mean equation, separately for the period 1994-99 and 1999-2004. 
Looking at the first sub-sample, it becomes clear that communication by FOMC members is indeed 
a means to move markets: interest rates respond significantly to communication, although 
somewhat more consistently if communication is about monetary policy, whereas the effect of 
communication about the economic outlook is mainly found for the shorter maturities. In particular 
for monetary policy-related communication, interest rates respond with a hump-shaped pattern: 
rates at intermediate maturities respond most. The occasions with the largest effect on interest rates 
are the Congress hearings, where interest rates responded by up to 9 basis points.  
 
 
                           
15 Breakdowns into communication by the Chairman and other members, by internal and external members 
and by leaning with or against the wind for the second regime are analysed in the companion paper, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2004c). 
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Over the second sub-sample, 1999-2004, we find significantly lower parameter estimates in a large 
number of cases. Whereas communication in general still moves the markets, we do not find any 
significant response of interest rates to Congress hearings any longer. We conclude from this that in 
the period without FOMC statements, markets needed to infer the future course of monetary policy 
to a much larger extent from inter-meeting communication. 
The results are less clear-cut when looking at the effects of communication on market volatility 
(Table 7b).
16 Consistent with the reduced effect of Congress hearings on the level of interest rates, 
we find that the response of market volatility to communication has disappeared entirely under the 
new regime. For communication made at other occasions, there is a clear difference with respect to 
the content of communication: whereas we find that market volatility is generally reduced more 
strongly in the second regime in response to statements about the economic outlook, it has 
significantly risen for monetary policy-related communication.  
 
The role of macroeconomic news 
An alternative source of information from which markets can infer about the likely future course of 
monetary policy and the economic development obviously are the releases of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. This source of information should therefore have been used more intensely under the 
old disclosure regime than nowadays. We test therefore whether markets reacted more strongly to 
the surprise component contained in the released macroeconomic news prior to 1999, both in the 
sense that interest rates showed a stronger response and that volatility increased more. 
Again, we can resort to our earlier estimates of equations (1) and (2), where we already had 
included the macroeconomic releases as control variables. Table 8a shows the results for the mean 
equation for a number of macroeconomic announcements that we found to be important in earlier 
work (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004a), including leading indicators like the consumer confidence 
and ISM surveys and retail sales, real variables like industrial production, productivity, employment 
data like the nonfarm payroll and unemployment figures, and finally releases of the consumer price 
index. The parameters show generally the correct sign: stronger than expected leading indicators, 
output, employment and price data should increase interest rates, whereas larger unemployment 
rates should lead to falling interest rates. The largest reactions are found for the intermediate 
maturities, which is a common finding in the literature (e.g., Fleming and Remolona 1999) and is 
intuitive in the sense that monetary policy is likely to react to such surprises in the medium- rather 
than the short-run. 
 
                                                           
16 As mentioned above, the variables that distinguish the speeches according to content (with respect to the 
economic outlook or monetary policy) take the values of plus and minus one; we enter these with their 
absolute values in the variance equations. 
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 457
March 2005 
 
Comparing the two subperiods, it turns out that, although there are only very few instances where 
the parameters differ significantly across regimes, there is nonetheless an overall tendency for 
markets to react less to macroeconomic announcements under the new disclosure regimes. With the 
exception of the ISM survey, the parameters are generally smaller, and the share of significant 
parameters (at least at the 90% level) drops from 73% to 59%. Overall, this suggests that there is 
indeed some reduction in the importance markets attribute to macroeconomic releases, although 
these do still form an important source of information for markets. 
Another possibility is that markets have become more selective in what macroeconomic variables 
they focus on. In particular productivity has featured prominently in the Federal Reserve’s 
communication in recent years, and thus it may be possible that productivity releases have become 
more important under the new disclosure regime. However, we do not find strong evidence for this 
in the data as productivity releases do not affect the mean of interest rates significantly.
17 
Looking at the results for the volatility equation in Table 8b, a similar picture emerges: the reaction 
of market volatility is generally smaller under the new disclosure regime, with the exceptions of the 
ISM survey and the unemployment rate. In some cases, like for nonfarm payrolls or the CPI, 
consistent volatility effects throughout the maturity spectrum have disappeared entirely. 
 
The objective of the paper has been to assess whether the change in the Federal Reserve’s 
disclosure practice of 1999/2000 was successful in enhancing the effectiveness and transparency of 
each FOMC meeting which not only explains its monetary policy decision, but also contains a 
forward-looking element, in the form of an outlook for the monetary policy stance initially, and a 
balance-of-risks assessment concerning inflationary pressures and economic conditions in the 
"foreseeable future" nowadays.  
The empirical approach taken in the paper has been to compare both the market's reaction to FOMC 
decisions and its ability to anticipate and predict the future course of monetary policy under the new 
regime as compared to the previous regime. First, we find that markets have anticipated monetary 
policy decisions equally well under both regimes, when comparing the expectations just before each 
meeting with the actual decisions. Second, the reactions of financial markets to monetary policy are 
strikingly different across the two regimes. Not only do they have a larger effect on the level of 
                                                           
17 Interest rates can respond in an ambiguous fashion to productivity releases. On the one hand, real interest 
rates increase with higher productivity. On the other hand, several FOMC statements in our sample period 
contained a reference to high productivity growth as a contributing factor to contain costs and price pressures 
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(see, e.g., the press release on 3 October 2000), which implies that expectations of monetary policy should                                                                                                                                                        
ease, and thus interest rates should fall in response to higher than expected productivity. 
5.  Conclusion 
US monetary policy. This regime change entailed the publication of a statement immediately after  
interest rates if they are accompanied by an asymmetric risk assessment, but also the volatility 
induced by FOMC meetings has been significantly lower since 1999. Third, markets anticipate the 
next monetary policy decision earlier under the new disclosure regime, such that market interest 
rates move by a smaller magnitude over the whole inter-meeting period under the new regime. 
Taken together, these three pieces of evidence suggest that under the old regime markets were 
capable of compensating their lack of information from FOMC announcements by extracting 
information from other sources in the inter-meeting period. We find evidence that other Federal 
Reserve communication in the inter-meeting period, such as speeches, interviews and testimonies 
by FOMC members, have exerted a significantly larger impact on financial markets under the old 
regime. We also find that the markets reacted more strongly to releases of macroeconomic 
fundamentals under the regime prior to 1999. In this sense, markets may merely have shifted their 
attention from other types of information, such as inter-meeting communication and news about 
macroeconomic fundamentals, to the statements and balance-of-risks assessments of the FOMC 
decisions themselves to obtain the relevant information. 
How shall one assess this regime change? On the one hand, the change in the disclosure regime may 
be interpreted as an increase in transparency as markets are provided with relevant information at an 
earlier stage and in a more transparent manner. This makes it easier and less costly for markets to 
obtain the information, and helps reduce market uncertainty about the future course of monetary 
policy. On the other hand, our finding that markets attach less importance to news about 
macroeconomic fundamentals is contrary in spirit to King (2000), who argues that, with a 
transparent monetary policy reaction function, news should not be in the announcements of central 
banks, but should entirely arise in the development of the economy. We furthermore believe that the 
reaction of financial markets to the release of macroeconomic fundamentals can be an important 
source of information for the central bank about the markets’ diverse and possibly deviating views. 
Under its new disclosure policy, the Federal Reserve has less such information available. 
Several major issues are left unanswered as the scope and objective of the paper has been limited to 
the analysis of the change in the FOMC disclosure regime. In particular, while we have provided 
evidence that the market’s anticipation of monetary policy has improved in some ways, a verdict is 
still out on whether the approach adopted by the FOMC is optimal, or whether alternative 
communication strategies are superior in providing transparency and in enhancing the efficiency of 
monetary policy. What constitutes an “optimal” communication strategy is hotly debated and very 
much depends on ones understanding of the concepts of transparency and effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Some, as William Poole, phrase their view as: “Some will regard this approach [of choosing 
among a relatively few standard phrases] as providing ‘boilerplate’ language with little real 
meaning. My own judgement is that it is better to provide boilerplate with clear meaning than rich 
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language with a multiplicity of possible meanings. It just is not true that lots of words equals lots of 
disclosure and greater transparency” (Poole, 2003, p. 7). By contrast, others, such as Issing (2004), 
argue that the use of simple language and code words bears some serious dangers: “[With] the use 
of such ‘codes’… the central bank puts itself under pressure to fulfil a ‘quasi promise’. But if new 
developments change the assessment of the situation, then the central bank faces the dilemma of 
causing market disruptions through ‘disappointments’ of expectations, even if it can provide 
convincing reasons for the new assessment. Indications about future decisions are therefore always 
only conditional commitments. … The simpler the code, the larger the difficulty of clarifying the 
conditionality ex ante.” In order to assess these claims, one would need to compare the 
consequences of the different ways of communication chosen by different central banks. We leave 
this for future research. 
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Table 1: Consistency of FOMC balance-of-risks assessments and monetary policy 




Note: The table shows which bias announcement in the current FOMC meeting has been followed by what 
policy action in the subsequent meeting. As the stated horizon of the bias has been not only on the next 
meeting, but on the "foreseeable future", note that there is one case since 1999 in which an asymmetric bias 
has been announced for two consecutive meetings, with a corresponding monetary policy change at the third 
meeting only (13 August, 24 September and 6 November 2002). We have included the bias announcements 
for both meetings preceding the interest rate change as correctly anticipating the next move. 
1994-April 1999
bias: easing no change tightening all
e a s i n g2103
s y m m e t r i c 41 542 3
tightening 0 14 4 18
all 6 30 8 44
May 1999-2004
bias: easing no change tightening all
e a s i n g1 37 02 0
s y m m e t r i c 01 121 3
t i g h t e n i n g 0549
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Table 2: Consistency of FOMC balance-
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58.1% 





April 1999 ∆ 1999 ∆ 2000-2004 ∆ ∆∗
Number of meetings 44 42 6 36
Mean surprise -0.006 -0.018 0.021 -0.025
t-stat -0.418 -0.941 0.996 -1.115
Variance of the surprise 0.010 0.016 0.003 0.018
Mean absolute surprise 0.050 0.050 0.023 0.054
Variance of the absoute surprise 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.015
Maximum absolute surprise 0.250 0.500 0.125 0.500
Mean mean deviation 0.034 0.026 0.026 0.025
Mean dissent 0.318 0.381 0.500 0.361
Number of meetings 14 18 3 15
Mean surprise 0.012 -0.049 0.044 -0.068
t-stat 0.271 -1.108 1.091 -1.312
Variance of the surprise 0.027 0.035 0.005 0.040
Mean absolute surprise 0.114 0.108 0.044 0.120
Variance of the absoute surprise 0.013 0.026 0.005 * 0.029
Maximum absolute surprise 0.250 0.500 0.125 0.500
Mean mean deviation 0.055 0.048 0.047 0.048
Mean dissent 0.500 0.556 0.667 0.533
Note: ∆ denotes whether the parameter in the respective column is statistically significantly different 
from the parameter for February 1994 - April 1999. ∆∗ compares the periods 1999 and 2000-2004. 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
May 1999 - April 2004
all FOMC meeting days
FOMC meeting days with interest rate changes
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Table 4a: The effect of monetary policy surprises (I): mean equation 
maturity ∆
3 months 0.484 *** 0.078 0.456 *** 0.048
6 months 0.433 *** 0.045 0.417 *** 0.037
1 year 0.401 *** 0.048 0.294 *** 0.058
2 years 0.242 *** 0.058 0.216 ** 0.105
5 years 0.200 *** 0.059 0.210 0.142
10 years 0.040 0.054 0.143 0.158
20 years -0.071 0.055 0.070 0.130
Feb 1994-April 1999 May 1999-April 2004
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether the parameters are different 
for the two subsamples.  
 
Table 4b: The effect of monetary policy surprises (II): variance equation 
maturity ∆
3 months 0.510 *** 0.072 -0.016 0.061 ***
6 months 0.294 *** 0.065 0.040 0.065 ***
1 year 0.165 *** 0.058 -0.094 0.076 ***
2 years -0.034 0.062 0.122 * 0.068 *
5 years 0.053 0.069 0.126 0.085
10 years 0.055 0.072 0.147 * 0.083
20 years 0.148 ** 0.069 0.232 *** 0.075
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether the parameters are different 
for the two subsamples.
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Table 5a: The effect of balance-of-risks statements (I): mean equation 
maturity
∆∆
3 months -0.010 *** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.004 *** 0.301 ** 0.118 0.627 *** 0.065 **
6 months -0.005 0.004 0.014 *** 0.004 *** 0.250 *** 0.061 0.498 *** 0.066 ***
1 year 0.001 0.007 0.012 ** 0.006 0.468 *** 0.109 0.270 *** 0.070
2 years 0.005 0.012 0.022 ** 0.010 0.350 0.302 0.172 0.118
5 years -0.010 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.270 *** 0.064 0.169 0.105
10 years 0.001 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.222 0.359 0.121 0.179
20 years 0.004 0.013 0.002 *** 0.000 0.130 *** 0.033 -0.008 0.043 **
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes 
whether the parameters are different for the two subsamples. Sample period: May 1999-April 2004.
symmetric bias asymmetric bias
policy surprise with 
symmetric bias




Table 5b: The effect of balance-of-risks statements (II): variance equation 
maturity
∆
3 months -0.216 0.136 -0.089 0.074
6 months -0.173 0.161 -0.106 0.091
1 year -0.166 0.117 -0.249 *** 0.087
2 years 0.114 0.078 -0.015 0.053
5 years 0.081 0.083 0.010 0.038
10 years -0.043 0.123 -0.071 0.089
20 years -0.003 0.116 -0.017 0.060
symmetric bias asymmetric bias
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, 
respectively. Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether the 
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Table 6: Adjustment of market interest rates in the FOMC inter-meeting period       





April 1999 ∆ 1999 ∆ 2000-2004 ∆ ∆∗
Number of meetings 44 42 6 36
Mean absolute change 0.187 0.146 0.282 0.123 * **
Variance of the absolute change 0.038 0.018 ** 0.022 0.014 ***
Maximum absolute change 0.870 0.480 0.480 0.450
Number of meetings 14 18 3 15
Mean absolute change 0.362 0.205 ** 0.340 0.178 **
Variance of the absolute change 0.063 0.013 ** 0.018 0.008 ***
Maximum absolute change 0.870 0.480 0.480 0.340
May 1999-April 2004
all FOMC meetings
FOMC meetings with interest rate changes
Note: ∆ denotes whether the parameter in the respective column is statistically significantly different 
from the parameter for February 1994-April 1999. ∆∗ compares the periods 1999 and 2000-2004. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 7a: The effect of FOMC communication (I): mean equation 
maturity ∆
3 months 0.010 *** 0.003 0.006 *** 0.002
6 months 0.013 *** 0.004 0.010 *** 0.002
1 year 0.011 ** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004
2 years 0.012 * 0.006 0.023 *** 0.006
5 years 0.007 0.007 0.024 *** 0.007 *
10 years 0.004 0.007 0.018 *** 0.007
20 years 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.006
3 months 0.055 *** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 ***
6 months 0.031 *** 0.004 0.005 * 0.003 ***
1 year 0.033 *** 0.005 0.012 *** 0.004 ***
2 years 0.029 *** 0.006 0.015 ** 0.007
5 years 0.033 *** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.007 **
10 years 0.027 *** 0.006 0.010 0.007 *
20 years 0.025 *** 0.006 0.008 0.006 **
3 months 0.042 *** 0.007 -0.001 0.011 ***
6 months 0.040 *** 0.010 0.008 0.007 ***
1 year 0.064 *** 0.014 0.006 0.010 ***
2 years 0.059 *** 0.016 -0.005 0.013 ***
5 years 0.052 *** 0.018 0.010 0.015 *
10 years 0.037 * 0.020 0.007 *** 0.000
20 years 0.041 *** 0.016 -0.010 0.012 **
3 months 0.030 ** 0.012 0.008 0.010
6 months 0.035 ** 0.015 0.012 0.015
1 year 0.068 *** 0.013 0.021 0.016 **
2 years 0.075 *** 0.013 0.016 0.026 **
5 years 0.081 *** 0.018 0.010 0.022 **
10 years 0.078 *** 0.017 0.031 * 0.017 **
20 years 0.046 *** 0.016 0.008 0.015 *
3 months 0.011 *** 0.004 0.003 0.003
6 months 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005
1 year 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009
2 years 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.013
5 years 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.014
10 years 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.013
20 years 0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.012
3 months 0.044 *** 0.006 0.013 *** 0.003 ***
6 months 0.020 *** 0.007 0.003 0.004 **
1 year 0.009 0.008 0.015 ** 0.006
2 years 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.009
5 years 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.010
10 years 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.010
20 years 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.009




































































Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, 
respectively. Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether 
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Table 7b: The effect of FOMC communication (II): variance equation 
maturity ∆
3 months -0.355 *** 0.044 -0.245 *** 0.037 *
6 months -0.101 *** 0.035 -0.144 *** 0.039
1 year -0.028 0.023 -0.003 0.045
2 years 0.017 0.028 -0.019 0.046
5 years 0.010 0.041 0.017 0.051
10 years 0.044 0.042 0.011 0.049
20 years -0.008 0.047 -0.062 0.046
3 months 0.253 *** 0.035 0.250 *** 0.018
6 months 0.178 *** 0.032 0.176 *** 0.021
1 year 0.164 *** 0.030 0.123 *** 0.025
2 years 0.107 *** 0.031 0.153 *** 0.026
5 years 0.052 0.036 0.155 *** 0.030 **
10 years 0.030 0.040 0.145 *** 0.032 **
20 years 0.028 0.036 0.093 *** 0.029
3 months -0.748 *** 0.203 0.256 * 0.154 ***
6 months 0.411 ** 0.175 0.153 0.160
1 year 0.875 *** 0.167 0.305 * 0.174 **
2 years 0.943 *** 0.163 0.157 0.190 ***
5 years 0.757 *** 0.198 0.171 0.172 **
10 years 1.160 *** 0.202 0.276 0.194 ***
20 years 0.388 * 0.198 0.127 0.183
3 months 0.450 *** 0.160 -0.141 0.185 **
6 months -0.234 0.164 -0.043 0.229
1 year -0.205 0.171 0.146 0.249
2 years -0.440 *** 0.148 0.290 0.220 ***
5 years -0.229 0.173 0.017 0.226
10 years -0.388 ** 0.187 -0.243 0.226
20 years 0.034 0.171 -0.596 ** 0.243 **
3 months -0.274 *** 0.078 -0.445 *** 0.065 *
6 months -0.228 *** 0.065 -0.504 *** 0.077 ***
1 year -0.086 0.058 -0.421 *** 0.084 ***
2 years -0.020 0.063 -0.206 *** 0.079 *
5 years 0.007 0.080 -0.045 0.089
10 years -0.006 0.082 -0.015 0.092
20 years -0.018 0.083 -0.033 0.088
3 months 0.051 0.066 0.347 *** 0.023 ***
6 months 0.100 ** 0.050 0.257 *** 0.027 ***
1 year 0.019 0.055 0.243 *** 0.033 ***
2 years 0.080 0.057 0.287 *** 0.036 ***
5 years -0.034 0.061 0.254 *** 0.041 ***
10 years -0.083 0.063 0.196 *** 0.046 ***
20 years -0.065 0.059 0.142 *** 0.044 ***
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, 
respectively. Numbers in italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether 
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Table 8a: Market reactions to macro announcements (I): mean equation 
maturity ∆
3 months 0.009 0.024 -0.010 0.008
6 months 0.088 *** 0.027 0.021 0.015 **
1 year 0.120 *** 0.030 0.054 * 0.030
2 years 0.137 *** 0.037 0.066 0.041
5 years 0.149 *** 0.041 0.090 ** 0.038
10 years 0.109 *** 0.040 0.088 ** 0.038
20 years 0.099 ** 0.043 0.060 0.040
3 months 0.015 ** 0.006 -0.005 0.006 **
6 months 0.029 *** 0.009 0.020 ** 0.008
1 year 0.062 *** 0.013 0.058 *** 0.010
2 years 0.086 *** 0.016 0.099 *** 0.019
5 years 0.095 *** 0.017 0.102 *** 0.021
10 years 0.077 *** 0.017 0.098 *** 0.020
20 years 0.067 *** 0.015 0.084 *** 0.018
3 months 0.067 *** 0.015 0.086 *** 0.018
6 months 0.012 0.011 0.010 * 0.005 **
1 year 0.033 *** 0.011 0.004 0.006
2 years 0.052 *** 0.015 0.033 ** 0.013
5 years 0.070 *** 0.018 0.067 *** 0.015
10 years 0.078 *** 0.020 0.059 *** 0.016
20 years 0.072 *** 0.019 0.045 *** 0.016
3 months 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.005
6 months 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.005
1 year 0.035 ** 0.015 0.010 0.010
2 years 0.048 ** 0.019 0.036 ** 0.014
5 years 0.042 ** 0.019 0.039 ** 0.016
10 years 0.025 0.017 0.033 ** 0.015
20 years 0.014 0.017 0.032 ** 0.015
3 months 0.022 0.044 0.002 0.012
6 months -0.001 0.059 -0.002 0.015
1 year 0.023 0.038 -0.006 0.045
2 years 0.013 0.048 -0.008 0.046
5 years 0.034 0.030 -0.017 0.038
10 years 0.036 0.090 -0.048 0.056
20 years 0.014 0.073 -0.045 0.036
3 months -0.100 *** 0.029 -0.032 0.032
6 months -0.157 *** 0.034 -0.121 ** 0.052
1 year -0.111 *** 0.042 -0.100 0.078
2 years -0.183 *** 0.052 -0.212 * 0.119
5 years -0.169 *** 0.056 -0.180 0.138
10 years -0.134 ** 0.055 -0.178 0.113
20 years -0.110 ** 0.055 -0.132 0.089
3 months 0.026 *** 0.004 0.018 *** 0.003
6 months 0.055 *** 0.006 0.023 *** 0.003 ***
1 year 0.071 *** 0.011 0.047 *** 0.008 *
2 years 0.078 *** 0.013 0.067 *** 0.011
5 years 0.091 *** 0.014 0.061 *** 0.014
10 years 0.073 *** 0.015 0.048 *** 0.012
20 years 0.066 *** 0.014 0.032 *** 0.011 *
3 months 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.005
6 months 0.014 0.013 0.017 *** 0.006
1 year 0.050 *** 0.015 0.029 *** 0.009
2 years 0.050 *** 0.017 0.035 *** 0.012
5 years 0.046 ** 0.018 0.041 *** 0.013
10 years 0.034 * 0.019 0.022 * 0.013




















May 1999 - April 2004
Note: Data for productivity available from 1998. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. Numbers in 
italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether the parameters are 
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Table 8b: Market reactions to macro announcements (II): variance equation 
maturity ∆
3 months 0.636 * 0.352 -1.036 *** 0.334 ***
6 months 1.052 *** 0.348 -0.199 0.344 **
1 year 2.097 *** 0.250 1.534 *** 0.339
2 years 1.537 *** 0.259 1.073 *** 0.318
5 years 1.479 *** 0.287 0.693 * 0.372 *
10 years 1.409 *** 0.312 0.774 ** 0.380
20 years 1.356 *** 0.316 1.383 *** 0.325
3 months 0.435 *** 0.114 0.811 *** 0.096 **
6 months 0.444 *** 0.161 0.910 *** 0.093 **
1 year -0.132 0.133 0.329 *** 0.103 ***
2 years -0.265 * 0.137 0.825 *** 0.102 ***
5 years -0.406 ** 0.158 1.030 *** 0.135 ***
10 years -0.329 ** 0.166 0.800 *** 0.163 ***
20 years -0.157 0.157 0.660 *** 0.155 ***
3 months -0.697 *** 0.187 -0.153 0.104 **
6 months -0.327 ** 0.156 0.156 0.097 ***
1 year 0.458 *** 0.140 0.366 *** 0.103
2 years 0.373 ** 0.150 0.383 *** 0.103
5 years -0.068 0.175 0.358 *** 0.116 **
10 years -0.250 0.192 0.324 *** 0.115 **
20 years -0.044 0.183 0.353 *** 0.109 *
3 months 0.109 0.191 -0.717 *** 0.169 ***
6 months 0.166 0.132 -0.720 *** 0.151 ***
1 year -0.333 *** 0.106 -0.625 *** 0.148
2 years -0.323 *** 0.123 -0.439 *** 0.147
5 years -0.549 *** 0.152 -0.448 *** 0.166
10 years -0.528 *** 0.162 -0.455 *** 0.172
20 years -0.522 *** 0.156 -0.287 ** 0.135
3 months -2.960 *** 0.809 -0.635 0.401 **
6 months -1.819 ** 0.776 -0.700 ** 0.320
1 year -3.813 *** 0.756 0.056 0.368 ***
2 years -3.593 *** 1.025 -0.156 0.276 ***
5 years -2.888 ** 1.164 0.064 0.325 **
10 years -1.165 0.869 0.749 ** 0.298 **
20 years -1.772 ** 0.826 0.200 0.335 **
3 months -3.314 *** 0.553 4.568 *** 0.216 ***
6 months -2.184 *** 0.552 5.125 *** 0.245 ***
1 year -2.279 *** 0.512 4.812 *** 0.261 ***
2 years -2.266 *** 0.542 2.679 *** 0.295 ***
5 years -1.549 *** 0.577 0.640 0.431 ***
10 years -1.025 * 0.570 -0.044 0.675
20 years -0.755 0.554 -0.432 0.680
3 months 0.588 *** 0.070 0.070 0.079 ***
6 months 0.756 *** 0.067 0.066 0.069 ***
1 year 1.062 *** 0.049 0.006 0.085 ***
2 years 1.074 *** 0.049 -0.052 0.086 ***
5 years 1.019 *** 0.058 0.000 0.093 ***
10 years 1.005 *** 0.063 0.005 0.105 ***
20 years 0.779 *** 0.064 -0.090 0.092 ***
3 months 0.759 *** 0.193 0.214 * 0.110 **
6 months 0.395 ** 0.165 0.236 * 0.126
1 year 0.321 ** 0.147 0.005 0.130
2 years 0.502 *** 0.160 0.063 0.125 **
5 years 0.717 *** 0.172 -0.234 * 0.132 ***
10 years 0.825 *** 0.183 -0.041 0.141 ***
20 years 0.639 *** 0.177 -0.064 0.128 ***













Note: Data for productivity available from 1998. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. Numbers in 
italics are standard errors. ∆ denotes whether the parameters are 
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Figure 1: Adjustment of market interest rates under alternative disclosure regimes 
Comparison of 25 bp tightening on 25 March 1997 versus 2 February 2000 
 
 
Note: Interest rates for the 25 March 1997 tightening episode are shown on the right-hand-side axis whereas 
those for the 2 February 2000 episode are depicted on the left-hand-side axis. Both tightening days are scaled 
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